Significance and limitations of the VAR figures publicly disclosed by large financial institutions. by Lévy-Rueff, G.
Signiﬁ  cance and limitations of the VAR ﬁ  gures 
publicly disclosed by large ﬁ  nancial institutions 
GUY LÉVY-RUEFF
Financial Stability Coordination Directorate
Financial Stability and Market Research Division
The value-at-risk (VAR) ﬁ  gures publicly disclosed by the major banks provide useful information on the 
market risk taken by the banking system. But a number of methodological precautions need to be taken when 
analysing these ﬁ  gures. These are detailed in this article. The assumptions underlying VAR calculations 
can, indeed, differ from one institution to the next and are rarely very explicit. The conclusions to be drawn 
from these ﬁ  gures should therefore be treated with caution. 
The information provided by disclosed VARs should be corroborated by other indicators and analysed 
against the general macro-ﬁ  nancial backdrop. When they point to greater risk exposures, these ﬁ  gures act 
as warning signals for conducting more in-depth analyses of the vulnerabilities that could affect ﬁ  nancial 
stability. 
VAR ﬁ  gures disclosed by ﬁ  nancial institutions are  closely monitored by central banks and are, for example, 
often discussed in the overview of the Banque de France’s Financial Stability Review. These ﬁ  gures have 
contributed to supporting our assessment of a rise in market risk exposures at the time when short-term 
interest rates were uniformly very low, before the Fed started raising its key rates, which called for heightened 
vigilance even though the macro-ﬁ  nancial context appeared favourable. 
Central banks’ constant concerns about greater transparency on the part of ﬁ  nancial institutions resulted in 
the publication of the Fisher II report. In this framework, one way of strengthening ﬁ  nancial stability would 
be to encourage credit institutions to be more transparent as regards their methods for calculating disclosed 
VARs. Credit institutions could, for instance, include more precise and easily comparable methodological 
explanations in their annual reports. This should not prevent the leading banks from setting up more 
sophisticated risk management techniques nor impinge on their communication policy. By authorising banks 
to use – subject to validation – an internal ratings-based approach for calculating their regulatory capital 
requirements, banking supervisors have actually acknowledged at the international level the diversity of 
markets and operations carried out by banks. This diversity implies adopting calculation methods tailored 
to the speciﬁ  city and management techniques of each bank. Banks should in fact provide analysts with the 
most relevant information possible. But, in view of current practices, the level of transparency as regards 
the methods used is still insufﬁ  cient. In addition, ﬁ  nancial institutions other than banks, for example hedge 
funds, should also be encouraged to disclose their VAR ﬁ  gures.
Lastly, ﬁ  nancial institutions should disclose their stress tests on a more regular basis, as a methodological 
complement to the VAR ﬁ  gures, but also in order to prevent a potential homogenisation of behaviours which 
could result from an exclusive use of VARs in banks’ communication strategies.
NB :  This study was drawn up by a cross-departmental working group, co-ordinated by Guy Levy-Rueff, and composed of representatives from the Directorate General 
Operations and the General Secretariat of the Commission Bancaire. I would like to thank all of the people involved; I am responsible for any remaining errors.
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A
n increasing number of central banks 
regularly publish in their ﬁ  nancial stability 
reviews the VAR ﬁ  gures publicly disclosed 
by large ﬁ  nancial institutions. These indicators are 
used to measure the market risks taken on by these 
institutions and thus to better identify potential 
sources of vulnerability within the ﬁ  nancial sector 
and gain a better grasp of certain market dynamics. 
They are also often discussed within international 
for a, such as the Financial Stability Forum. 
This study is divided into three parts. In Part 1, the 
characteristics and the signiﬁ  cance of the VAR ﬁ  gures 
disclosed by credit institutions are analysed in the 
framework of an assessment of ﬁ  nancial stability. 
Part 2 looks at the heterogeneity and methodological 
limitations of the disclosed VARs. In Part 3, the 
issues of ﬁ  nancial institutions’ transparency are put 
into perspective so as to throw light on the speciﬁ  c 
VAR-related analysis. 
1|  VAR: A COMPREHENSIVE  
  TOOL FOR MEASURING  
  RISK EXPOSURES
1|1  VAR as a risk management tool 
DEFINITION
VAR is deﬁ  ned mathematically as the worst-case 
market losses arising from a downturn in market 
prices, over a speciﬁ  c period of time and with a 
given probability (known as the conﬁ  dence level). 
The VAR is a global and probabilistic measure of 
market risk. For example, if a bank’s 10-day VAR at 
a 99% conﬁ  dence level is EUR 5 million, this means 
that it would have a 99% chance of not suffering a 
loss of over EUR 5 million over a 10-day period.
There are three major approaches for measuring VARs: 
parametric, historical and Monte Carlo. In all three 
cases, the results depend to a large extent on historical 
data.1 The role of historical data is clearly apparent 
in the case of the historical approach; in both other 
cases, it stems from the technical method used for 
calculating the VAR (parametric approach) or the type 
of simulation of risk factor movements (Monte Carlo 
approach). A variance/covariance matrix is used to 
establish a link between the risk factors derived from 
the market variables (i.e. to take into consideration 
price volatility and their correlations). This matrix is 
based on historical series of market price movements. 
Depending on its activities or risks, a credit institution 
can use a combination of different approaches: for 
example, the parametric approach can be used for 
the treatment of bond, foreign exchange and equity 
portfolios and the Monte Carlo or historical simulation 
in the case of option portfolios. 
• The method for calculating the parametric VAR 
is relatively simple in practice, but it is subject to a 
number of relatively tight theoretical assumptions. 
The most commonly known model is probably 
RiskMetrics. The main simplifying assumptions 
are the following: market price variations follow 
a normal probability distribution (corresponding 
to the Laplace-Gauss bell-shaped curve) and the 
instruments show a linear risk proﬁ  le. Under these 
assumptions, the variance/covariance matrix can 
quite easily be applied to the risk positions held in 
order to calculate the VAR. 
• The historical VAR is based on the postulate that 
future market developments will be similar to past 
developments (the previous year’s developments, 
for example). The ﬁ  rst step consists in recording 
daily variations in market prices or risk factors 
over a given period. The next step is to apply these 
changes to the daily risk positions held. The result 
is a distribution of possible losses.
• In the case of the Monte Carlo VAR, a simulation 
of the possible future movements of risk factors is 
conducted a large number of times (usually 10,000 
times). The result is a proﬁ  t and loss distribution, 
from which one can derive a possible worst-case loss 
for a given conﬁ  dence interval. This approach can, 
in theory, be applied irrespective of the probability 
distribution. But in practice, it is generally used, 
for technical reasons, on the assumption that the 
relative variations in market parameters follow a 
normal distribution.
1  It is therefore important to have sound historical databases for this type of measurement.
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More sophisticated techniques such as the Conditional 
Value-at-Risk (CVAR) can be used in addition to the 
VAR, but they do not come under the remit of this 
study because CVARs are not disclosed by banks. 
ADVANTAGES COMPARED WITH OTHER RISK 
MANAGEMENT TOOLS
Because it combines several risk factors and 
measures their interaction, VAR takes into account 
(and therefore encourages) portfolio diversiﬁ  cation. 
All other things being equal, diversiﬁ  ed portfolios 
tend to display higher VARs than non-diversiﬁ  ed 
portfolios (even though, mathematically, the VAR 
of a portfolio comprising several sub-portfolios can, 
for a similar conﬁ  dence interval, exceed the sum 
of the individual VARs of the sub-portfolios in the 
case of speciﬁ  c underlying distribution laws; see the 
appendix on VAR aggregation). 
Thanks to the VAR measure, it has been possible to 
shift from a logic based on isolated risk indicators to a 
logic based on a probabilistic measure of global risk. 
Traditional measures are used to estimate, through 
multiple individual risk indicators (for example, 
sensitivity to interest rates), the instant loss on each 
instrument following a small market price variation. 
However, they do not quantify the probability of 
such losses: are they frequent or exceptional? 
VAR has thus become a standard measure 
of market risk, used by all major banks. The 
development of common references regarding 
risk assessment contributes to fostering exchanges 
between professionals and promoting a common 
understanding of market participants’ behaviour. 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS’ USE OF VAR 
VAR measures are generally used to assess market 
risk. In this respect, they have become a signiﬁ  cant 
parameter for strategic decision-making in most 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. Banks often use the level of 
risk (as measured by the VAR), in addition to the 
expected return, as a determinant for positioning 
themselves on a certain type of market, ﬁ  nancial 
product range or geographical area. 
From a more operational perspective, VAR is an 
important and widely-used tool for managing market 
risk. A large number of banks allocate VAR budgets 
to their operational departments, which are in turn 
responsible for assigning them to their various 
teams. On a daily basis, traders manage their risk 
positions based on operational limits consistent with 
the VAR limits.
VAR is also used as an internal tool for reporting 
consolidated market risks to ﬁ  nancial institutions’ top 
Approaches for measuring VARs
Types of VaR Advantages Drawbacks
Parametric •  Easy and quick calculations based solely on the 
variance/covariance matrix
•  Unsuited to non-linear positions (in particular 
options)
• Ill-suited to fat-tailed distributions and non-normal 
distributions 
Historical •  No assumptions on the shape of the distribution 
curve. It can, to a certain extent, capture outlying 
events (if the historical period under consideration is 
properly speciﬁ  ed)
•  Is suited to all types of instrument, including 
options
•  No guarantee of the relevance of the chosen 
historical period (this is particularly important as there 
is no other complementary model).
• There is a risk that certain complex instruments will 
be incorrectly valued (for example, the price of certain 
options are not directly available on the market, but 
calculated) 
Monte Carlo •  Is also suited to all types of instrument, including 
options
•  A large number of scenarios can be tested. It is 
suited to fat-tailed distributions (outlying events can 
be captured to a certain extent)
•  Computationally very intensive.
• The model risk is larger than with the other two 
approaches and certain complex instruments might 
also be incorrectly valued (certain options for example) 
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management. With just a few characteristic ﬁ  gures (for 
example, global VAR as well as interest rate, exchange rate, 
equity and commodity VARs), this indicator provides a 
snapshot of market risk exposures, with the possibility 
of analysing their development over time. While credit 
institutions have mainly recourse to VAR measures for 
assessing market risk – this is the type of risk this article 
focuses on –, they can also use them to measure all types 
of risk, in particular credit risk and operational risk. 
Lastly, VAR is an indicator reported to supervisory 
authorities. Because it is generally considered to be a 
good risk management tool, it is accepted by banking 
supervisors as a basis for calculating regulatory 
capital requirements (alongside alternative methods 
of calculation).2 Most French banking groups rely 
on VAR ﬁ  gures to calculate their capital adequacy 
ratio, after having had their speciﬁ  c internal model 
approved by the regulatory authorities for most 
of their activities, and the regulator uses these 
indicators for its supervisory missions.
In addition to meeting the requirements set out by 
the supervisory authorities, VAR public disclosures 
are also used as a communication tool with the 
market in order to highlight banks’ capacity and 
willingness to comply with market standards in 
terms of risk management. This article focuses on 
the signiﬁ  cance and limitations of these publicly 
disclosed VARs.
1|2  The disclosure of VAR
 ﬁ  gures contributes 
  to a better understanding 
 of  macro-ﬁ  nancial risk
VAR MEASURES ARE CONSISTENT WITH OTHER 
ANALYSES OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
The VAR ﬁ  gures disclosed by French banks are on the 
whole consistent with the rest of the statistics reported 
to the supervisory authorities. By way of illustration, 
Table 1 shows the data published by the main French 
banks in their annual reports at end-2004.
Table 1
VaR disclosed by the main French credit institutions
(one-day, 99%) 
(EUR millions)














rate risk 28 30 5.0
Foreign 
exchange rate 2 1 0.2
Equity risk 15 12 6.0
Commodity 
risk 3 3 0.4
Other
Diversiﬁ  cation 18 -21 -4.5
Total 30 25 28 (a) 16 10 7.0
(a)  As Table 3 shows, the breakdown of the VaR disclosed by Casa is slightly 
different from that of the other banks; it is therefore not shown here
Sources: banks’ annual reports
These ﬁ  gures corroborate what we know about 
French banks’ respective risk positions and are 
relatively coherent in view of their main activities. 
It seems normal to have large exposures on interest 
rate and equity markets and small exposures on 
foreign exchange and commodity markets. As shown 
in Table 2, these statistics are also in line with the 
level of net banking income on capital markets 
(although the scope of net banking income in the 
corporate and investment banking segment extends 
beyond trading activity strictly speaking). 
Table 2
Net banking income of major French banks
corporate and investment business
(EUR billions)
NBI 2004  BNPP SG Casa IXIS CCF  NBP
CIB 5.7 4.7 3.9 1.3 0.6 1.3
Sources: banks’ annual reports
VAR MEASUREMENTS APPEAR RELATIVELY ROBUST
In general, the backtesting exercises applied by French 
banks to their VAR statistics — which are published 
in roughly two thirds of their disclosures — show that 
2  Regulatory capital requirements for hedging market risk exposures can be calculated using a 10-day VaR with a 99% conﬁ  dence interval, multiplied by a coefﬁ  cient 
of at least 3.
78  Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 7 • November 2005ARTICLES
Signiﬁ  cance and limitations of the VAR ﬁ  gures publicly disclosed by large ﬁ  nancial institutions
losses do not exceed estimated VARs. Backtesting 
consists in checking that the possible ex post losses 
are either lower or equal to the VAR ﬁ  gures calculated 
ex ante. With the exception of one credit institution 
for which losses occasionally exceeded the global 
VAR ﬁ  gure in 2003 and 2004, French banks have not 
recorded any overrun. Of course, these calculations 
are generally skewed by the fact that the ex post 
results often include commercial  margins which 
offset part of the losses before they are actually 
taken into account. Nevertheless, the results of these 
backtesting exercises are encouraging.
Lastly, the overall approach to presenting VARs is 
relevant, in particular the breakdown by types of 
risk or activity: interest rates, foreign exchange, 
equity, commodity prices. This breakdown provides 
a relatively good overview of the types of risk within 
a given portfolio. 
A BETTER INSIGHT INTO THE BANKING SECTOR’S 
RISK EXPOSURES IN TERMS OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 
In addition to being used internally by almost 
all credit institutions as a risk management tool, 
disclosed VAR data can also be used for more
macro-ﬁ  nancial studies. 
True, VAR statistics only measure market risk, 
although credit risk is largely predominant.3 
Furthermore, even though VAR ﬁ  gures  are, 
theoretically, accurate indicators of the worst-case 
market losses incurred by each credit institution, 
they should be treated with caution given their 
methodological limitations: rather than look at 
absolute ﬁ  gures for each institution, one should 
analyse general trends. 
However, bearing in mind these limitations (described 
in the following section), VAR data disclosed by 
credit institutions help central banks to back up 
their ﬁ  nancial stability assessments, because they 
provide a signiﬁ  cant — albeit somewhat incomplete 
— insight into ﬁ  nancial institutions’ market risk 
exposures. This is also the conclusion that emerges 
from the econometric study conducted by P.Jorion 
on the VAR ﬁ  gures disclosed by eight US banking 
groups over the 1995-2000 period.4
As banks play a key role in the ﬁ  nancial system 
and the ﬁ   nancing of the economy, analysing 
their behaviour (and in particular their possible 
weaknesses) is clearly an important aspect of any 
study on the vulnerability factors which might 
undermine ﬁ  nancial stability, both through the 
channel of macro-economic sequences and the 
channel of market dynamics. From this point of view, 
disclosed VARs provide useful publicly-available 
information on the market risks taken on by the 
banking system as a whole and each individual 
(major) credit institution.
Risk-taking is not in itself a weakness because it is an 
integral part of the banking profession: it contributes to 
raising the banking sector’s proﬁ  tability if decisions are 
taken judiciously. But when risk exposures increase 
sharply, credit institutions can — all other things being 
equal — become more sensitive to a rise in volatility, 
a decline in liquidity or, more generally, unexpected 
market swings. Following a dip in the market, they 
may record signiﬁ  cant losses which are likely to 
undermine their ﬁ  nancial soundness. They may also, 
in some cases, have to adjust their market behaviour, 
and possibly their lending behaviour in an atypical 
manner, with repercussions on ﬁ  nancial stability. 
1|3  Different ways of analysing 
  individual and aggregate VAR ﬁ  gures
VAR statistics disclosed by a representative sample of 
banks can be compounded in the form of synthetic 
indicators in order to conduct a macro-ﬁ  nancial 
analysis. It is thus possible to calculate different 
types of “average” VARs (see Appendix). However, 
in order to be properly interpreted, these synthetic 
indicators must always be accompanied by a 
measure of VAR dispersion (for example, minimums 
and maximums, fractiles or the standard deviation 
of individual VARs). 
The VAR ﬁ  gures disclosed individually by each 
ﬁ   nancial institution form the bedrock of any 
macro-ﬁ  nancial aggregate analysis. Variations in 
these ﬁ  gures are relevant because they describe 
behavioural changes that are likely to affect market 
dynamics. On the other hand, absolute values are 
not particularly meaningful given that they depend, 
3  VAR is not calculated in the case of investment portfolios but only trading portfolios.
4  “How informative are Value-at-Risk disclosures”, 2002, Accounting Review
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to a large extent, on the mathematical hypotheses 
used for calculating the VAR (conﬁ  dence interval, 
length of the period under review, etc.) and that 
their calculation is subject to the methodological 
limitations referred to in the second part of this 
article. The breakdown of VAR ﬁ  gures by type of 
risk can contribute to enriching the analysis. As 
an example, the graph below shows that the share 
of equity risk exposure in banks’ total market risk 
exposure dropped signiﬁ  cantly following the bursting 
of the Internet bubble.
VAR ﬁ  gures also provide useful information when 
they are presented in the form of ratios. Looking at 
the variations over time in the VAR/equity capital 
ratio of one bank or drawing comparisons between 
various institutions gives an insight into the risk 
positions held by a credit institution relative to its 
capacity to absorb the potential losses incurred. The 
VAR/net banking income ratio provides an estimate 
of the effectiveness of risk taking; it can, however, 
be skewed by the share of recurrent customer 
activity-related earnings, which do not really 
remunerate risk-taking. Lastly, the max VAR/min 
VAR ratio is a proxy for measuring the volatility 
of a given institution’s VAR over the period under 
review.The graph below illustrates, for example, that 
investment banks have posted a lower ratio than 
generalist banks over the recent period, probably 
because traders in the former have a more constant 
use of their VAR limits.
Individual VAR analyses are carried out to make 
sure that certain phenomena that might have 
been masked by the aggregate analyses are not 
overlooked. They are also used to ascertain whether 
certain regressions between disclosed VARs (or ratios 
including VAR) and other variables are statistically 
signiﬁ  cant and relevant in terms of ﬁ  nancial stability 
analysis. At this stage, our quantitative analysis 
has, however, been rather inconclusive. The graph 
below looks, for example, at a possible relationship 
between the VAR/equity capital ratio and CDS 
premia. However, the regressions tested proved to 
be relatively insigniﬁ  cant as CDS premia do not only 
take market risk into account. They also turned out 
to be relatively unstable over time, probably because 
risk aversion changes signiﬁ  cantly from one year to 
the next. 
It remains to be established whether there is any 
signiﬁ  cant statistical relationship between the disclosed 
VARs, which are risk-taking indicators, and risk aversion 
indicators based on market price developments.
Graphique 1
Breakdown of the average VAR by type of underlying 
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Sources: banks’ annual reports
Graphique 2
Average of max VAR/min VAR ratios 
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Sources: banks’ annual reports
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Graphique 3
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Sources: banks’ annual reports, Bankscope, Credit trade, Banque de France
2|  LIMITATIONS OF THE 
 VAR  FIGURES DISCLOSED  
  BY LARGE BANKS
2|1 Methodological  limitations
Some of the methodological limitations are quite 
signiﬁ  cant. First, the VAR does not capture outliers 
beyond the conﬁ  dence interval. Portfolios showing 
the same VAR can, in some cases, generate 
extreme losses on which the VAR does not give any 
information (it would be necessary to calculate the 
CVAR). Furthermore, the outliers are the values for 
which the assumptions underlying VAR calculations 
are the most fragile: the calculation of the VAR, by 
means of the variance/covariance matrix, is based 
on correlations between assets and the stability of 
these correlations is not always borne out, especially 
beyond the conﬁ  dence interval. This is one of the 
reasons why it is necessary, in addition to calculating 
the VAR, to develop stress tests in order to quantify 
possible losses in extreme market conditions. 
Traditional VAR calculations do not take into account 
the risks of a change in liquidity conditions on 
certain markets, despite the fact that a shortage of 
liquidity during a period of market stress increases 
the risk of incurring losses.5
Thanks to the wide range of methods for calculating 
VAR, it is possible to tailor a method to the risk 
characteristics  of speciﬁ   c products. However, 
this variety of methods does not facilitate the 
interpretation of VAR ﬁ  gures and the comparison 
between several VARs: results can differ considerably 
depending on the method used; there are also often 
many possible parameters for a given method and 
they can signiﬁ  cantly alter the results. Lastly, a global 
VAR ﬁ  gure provides relatively little information on 
the nature and the relative weight of the various risk 
factors at work. 
The VAR does not encompass certain related aspects, such 
as the return on risks taken. A rise in VAR can actually be 
accompanied by an increase in the risk/return trade-off 
if the ex post return grows at a faster pace than the VAR 
(which is an ex ante measure of risk).
None of the techniques used by banks for measuring 
risk take into account the absolute level of risk factors, 
i.e. their proximity or distance from equilibrium 
values, despite the signiﬁ  cance of this issue in terms of 
ﬁ  nancial stability. Yet it has to be admitted that, when 
measuring the possible deviation from equilibrium 
values, there are clearly a number of judgement and 
contextual factors that do not lend themselves to a 
quantitative risk analysis. Lastly, there is always a great 
deal of uncertainty surrounding short-term market 
dynamics as one moves away from the equilibrium 
values: will the market return to equilibrium or will 
it continue to post sharp ﬂ  uctuations?
2|2 Comparing  VARs  disclosed 
  by banks is a tricky exercise
THE VOLUME AND QUALITY OF INFORMATION 
DISCLOSED BY BANKS IS STILL LARGELY INFERIOR 
TO THEIR INTERNAL INFORMATION 
The VAR publication format does not meet any 
commonly-approved presentation standards and the 
frequency of publication is variable (quarterly or annual).
5  The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II, chaired by Mr Corrigan, recently stressed the importance of taking greater account of liquidity risk in market 
and counterparty risk management.
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The disclosed VARs can be either 1-day or 10-day 
VARs. Yet, although it is easy to move from one 
to the other under the assumption of a Gaussian 
distribution function, this assumption is not always 
relevant. This is clearly apparent when banks 
publish both ﬁ  gures at the same time. 
The data disclosed by the various credit institutions 
are not homogenous. In some cases, only the global 
VAR is published, in other cases, the VAR is broken 
down by risk factors. Banks either publish period-end 
VARs or average VARs; minimum and maximum VARs 
are sometimes included. Out of the six major French 
banking groups, one does not publish average annual 
VAR and three do not disclose any information on 
the impact of market diversiﬁ  cation. Similarly, VAR 
ﬁ  gures are either broken down by risk factors or 
by business area depending on the communication 
policy adopted by each institution. Table 3 shows 
how VAR ﬁ  gures are currently broken down by each 
one of the six major French banking groups.
It is worth pointing out that it is not always clear 
whether the exact breakdown is by risk factors or 
business area. For example, does the interest rate 
VAR encompass all of the risks incurred by trading 
activities on interest rate markets, including unhedged 
exchange rate risk, or does it encompass the interest 
rate risk arising from activities on various markets 
(interest rate, equity and foreign exchange).6 
The type of information disclosed is also likely 
to change over time. For example, one credit 
institution disclosed two sets of information in its 
quarterly publications from December 2000 and 
March 2003: on the one hand, the quarter-end VAR 
broken down by type of activity, on the other, a 
backtesting calculation of its global VAR. The bank 
has continued to publish the former, but stopped 
publishing the latter between June 2003 and 
December 2003. In March 2004, it once again started 
disclosing its average global VAR over the quarter. 
This disclosure was interrupted in June 2004 but 
resumed in September 2004. 
COMPARISONS ARE RENDERED MORE DIFFICULT 
BY THE DIFFERENCES IN CALCULATION METHODS
As mentioned above, credit institutions can use 
parametric, historical or Monte Carlo approaches. 
They can apply a different method for each one 
of their activities in order to manage their various 
risks in the most optimal manner. There is therefore 
no guarantee that the data to be aggregated in a 
macro-ﬁ  nancial analysis is calculated using identical 
methods – although, ideally, this should be the case. 
The VARs are sufﬁ  ciently homogenous, however, to 
conduct a pertinent macro-ﬁ  nancial analysis, as long 
as one bears in mind their limitations.
In addition, the calculations made by credit 
institutions are more or less aggregated: some only 
aggregate sub-portfolio VARs, while others make 
more general calculations which take better account 
of the diversiﬁ  cation effects. Thus, the same initial 
risk positions do not necessarily yield the same VAR 
ﬁ  gures.
The range of activities included in the calculation 
of the disclosed VARs (cash management activities, 
portfolio investment, loan trading, etc.) varies from 
one bank to the next, as well as through time. The 
following passage from a credit institution’s annual 
report speaks for itself: “this measure [...] is being 
continuously improved, by adding new risk factors 
and extending the range of activities included in the 
calculation of the VAR”.
The techniques used by credit institutions change 
over time; some banks introduce new risk factors in 
line with the development of their activities. This is 
a good thing if it improves the pertinence of the VAR 
calculations. But it can cause problems in terms of 
ensuring the continuity of the analysis. For example, 
when one credit institution decided to include in 
its disclosed VAR measures of credit spread risk, 
which previously came under interest rate risk, the 
6  Regulatory VAR is systematically broken down by type of risk.
Table 3
Breakdown of VAR ﬁ  gures disclosed 
by major French banking groups
























risk Credit risk Commodity 
risk
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diversiﬁ  cation effect appeared to increase, rising 
from roughly 50% of gross risks to roughly 60%. 
Indeed, the diversiﬁ  cation effect between interest 
rates and credit spreads was previously concealed 
in the global interest rate VAR calculation. 
 
Moreover, disclosed VAR ﬁ  gures are based on a 
wider range of activities than the VAR data validated 
by the banking authorities and used to calculate 
each institution’s regulatory capital. Indeed, some 
banks may in their communication policy choose 
to disclose a global ﬁ  gure even if VAR calculations 
are not very accurate in the case of some activities 
(for example, for some speciﬁ  c arbitrage activities). 
Supervisory authorities may then request the bank 
to use other methods for the relevant activities. As 
a result, the VAR ﬁ  gures included in the regulatory 
reports might differ from those disclosed in the bank’s 
publications, without the ones always exceeding the 
others. Theses differences only occur for a small 
number of activities. However, in the absence of total 
transparency regarding the methods for calculating 
disclosed VARs, it is difﬁ  cult to measure with accuracy 
the implications of these choices and a comparison 
between banks is rendered all the more difﬁ  cult. 
These issues are, nevertheless, not entirely speciﬁ  c 
to disclosed VAR data. It is indeed worth noting that 
the VARs used to measure banks’ regulatory capital 
requirements cover various activities and are based 
on different calculation methods from one bank 
to the next, depending on the speciﬁ  city of their 
market activities.
2|3 Supplementing  disclosed  VAR 
 ﬁ  gures for the assessment 
 of  ﬁ  nancial stability
The accounting data contained in banks’ balance 
sheets and off-balance sheets (as well as their proﬁ  t 
and loss accounts) provide an insight into the weight 
of certain activities and the size of portfolios held 
by credit institutions which are at the root of the 
risks incurred, in particular as regards securities 
portfolios and derivatives. A major change in the 
weight of certain activities therefore requires an 
in-depth analysis of risk developments.
In addition to the VAR, most banks also carry out 
stress tests on their trading activities. These data are 
used as internal risk management indicators. They 
measure the implications for the banks of extreme 
market conditions, i.e. those conditions which are the 
most likely to expose credit institutions’ weaknesses. 
However, the information disclosed in this area is 
highly fragmented: this is the main impediment to 
using these data to conduct a global analysis of risks 
to ﬁ  nancial stability. 
Credit institutions sometimes disclose an indicator of 
their global exposure to interest rate risk — generally 
measured in the framework of their asset and liability 
management — for example, balance sheet maturity 
gaps. Here again, however, one comes up against 
the fact that ﬁ  nancial disclosure on the subject is 
very limited. 
The information stemming from the market’s 
perception of the level of risk taken on by ﬁ  nancial 
institutions differs from that on the actual level of 
risk as measured by VAR data.CDS prices or yield 
spreads between bonds issued by credit institutions 
and the swap curve can therefore also be useful.7 
However, no distinction is made between perception 
of market risk, credit risk and other types of risk 
(such as operational risk); in addition, both the risks 
incurred and the level and volatility of P&L are taken 
into account in CDS premia.
Graphique 4
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Other indicators of the market’s perception of risk 
can be developed. For example, the IMF currently 
7  Data for individual banks or indices can be used  as long as their liquidity is sufﬁ  cient.
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uses another measure based on market data in 
its Financial Stability Report. This risk indicator 
— called Market Risk Index or MRI — is the VAR 
for an equity portfolio of a representative sample of 
large banks weighted by their market capitalisation. 
This indicator, which has been progressively reﬁ  ned, 
is interesting, but just like yield spreads, it is not 
an indicator of the market risk actually taken on 
by credit institutions. It is an indicator of investors’ 
perception of the global risk on a bank’s equity 
portfolio (both credit and market risk) and, therefore, 
from the perspective of ﬁ  nancial stability analysis, 
an indicator of the market’s perception of banking 
risk. The IMF also uses another indicator called 
the Credit Risk Index, which is a synthetic index 
calculated on the basis of CDS premia.
Lastly, the various ratings awarded by rating 
agencies provide useful information, although their 
limitations are similar to those of market indicators: 
they provide information on the rating agencies’ 
perception of risk rather than on the risk actually 
taken on by banks; market and credit risk tend to 
be aggregated. 
3|  TOWARDS GREATER 
  TRANSPARENCY 
  OF DISCLOSED VARS? 
In conclusion, we will set out to put the issue of VAR 
disclosures by large ﬁ  nancial institutions into a larger 
perspective. It ﬁ  ts in with the more general drive 
on the part of central banks and banking regulators 
to achieve a greater degree of transparency. In this 
section, we will also seek to measure the progress 
that is yet to be made. 
3|1  French banks have made progress 
  in their VAR disclosures
As mentioned above, most major French banks (six 
out of seven) disclose a measure of their market 
risk in the form of VAR statistics, generally in their 
annual reports. 
At present, banks are strongly encouraged to disclosed 
their VAR ﬁ  gures, but it is not an obligation. The French 
Financial Markets Authority (AMF) imposes a number 
of risk disclosure obligations on the undertakings 
under its supervision, including listed banks. These 
obligations can be met by the disclosure of VAR 
ﬁ  gures, but also by other methods, with the supervised 
institutions enjoying a great degree of leeway.8
It is nevertheless not surprising that VAR disclosures 
have gained ground. This development ties in with 
the fact that — even prior to Basel II — transparency 
is being encouraged by regulators, rating agencies 
and, more generally, ﬁ  nancial markets. 
In addition, as most major French banks also use 
VAR models for their internal risk management 
and/or to calculate regulatory capital requirements, 
the cost of calculating disclosed VARs is limited. 
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that a similar process is 
underway in the United States. In 2004, for example, 
the SEC enacted a set of new rules for calculating 
minimum capital requirements that promote the 
use of the VAR method among major broker-dealers. 
Furthermore, the SEC requires the undertakings it 
supervises, in particular listed banks, to disclose 
measures of risk. These can be VAR statistics. The 
situation is close to that in France: the disclosure of 
VAR data is becoming increasingly common. Yet, the 
methodological limitations faced by any analysis are 
the same as those outlined in part 2 of this article. 
3|2  Use of disclosed VARs from a 
 ﬁ  nancial stability perspective
The previous issues of the Banque de France Financial 
Stability Review have highlighted the fact that the 
persistence of large macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances could eventually lead to a reversal of 
price trends on certain market segments and/or an 
increase in volatility. In this context, it is crucial that 
all market participants correctly assess their risks 
and be prepared to deal with market swings that 
would not correspond to their expectations. 
Obviously, this is more difﬁ  cult when banks are 
taking on greater risk exposures – as brought to light 
8  See recommendation No. 89-01 by the French Stock Exchange Commission (COB) and its recommendations for the drafting of reference documents in 2002, as well 
as the AMF’s recommendations for 2003.
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by their disclosed VARs. This was the case for a large 
number of major investment banks, in particular US 
banks, up until 2004, i.e. while short-term interest 
rates were uniformly very low, before the Fed started 
raising its key rates. This led the Banque de France 
to call for greater vigilance, against a macro-ﬁ  nancial 
backdrop that appears favourable yet harbours 
certain vulnerabilities. The graphs below illustrate 
the analysis underlying this assessment. They show 
the annual and quarterly growth of the aggregate 
VAR for a sample of major US banks, as well as the 
ratio between the VAR of the largest risk-taker and 
that of the least exposed bank.9
The increase in risk exposures — brought to light 
by disclosed VARs — was conﬁ  rmed by a broader 
analysis. This is reﬂ   ected in the recent boom 
in the CDO market and the strong growth in 
alternative investment funds, such as hedge funds. 
The emergence of a combination of vulnerability 
factors at the international level, such as higher risk 
exposures and less risk protection (in particular, low 
risk premia) should give rise to enhanced vigilance 
from a ﬁ  nancial stability perspective. 
This vigilance is particularly important in the current 
context of low market volatility. Recent levels of 
volatility are taken into account in VAR calculations. 
All other things being equal, VAR ﬁ  gures are smaller 
when the level of volatility is low. The VAR ﬁ  gures 
disclosed by major international banks — which are 
already on an uptrend — would have risen even further 
if the level of market volatility had been higher, more 
in line with historical averages. An analysis of risks to 
ﬁ  nancial stability should take into account the fact that 
banks could have to cut back or rapidly cover their risk 
positions should the level of volatility increase. This 
could lead to adverse developments in terms of market 
liquidity as well as overreactions on exchange rate 
and interest rate markets. And yet, risk management 
systems do not always take sufﬁ  ciently account of the 
risk of market liquidity drying up during a crisis. This 
could heighten the impact of price ﬂ  uctuations and 
limit the possibility of unwinding risk positions within 
the expected horizon or at the expected price. Some 
bank managements actually appear to be taking this 
analysis into consideration and tend to request their 
teams to reduce their VAR ﬁ  gures when volatility is 
low. This could explain the relative stability of the VAR 
ﬁ  gures disclosed by French banks.
In order to back up these macro-ﬁ  nancial studies, it is 
sometimes useful to analyse the VAR ﬁ  gures disclosed 
by each individual bank. But this will depend to a 
large extent on the degree of transparency adopted 
by each institution. 
In addition to the average VARs, ﬂ  uctuations in the 
VAR over the year should also be looked at if the 
information is available. Rapid variations in the 
VAR over the period under review — an indication 
of which is the ratio between the maximum and 
minimum VAR — can have several meanings. These 
should be brought to light — to the extent possible — 
bearing in mind the many facets of credit institutions’ 
behaviour. Rapid changes in the VAR within strict 
limits can reﬂ  ect very different situations: 
• they can be a sign of active risk management and 
positions taken on liquid markets, which can therefore 
9  When some data are missing, the calculations are re-based on a theoretical sample of seven banks.
Graphique 5
Aggregate VAR (in USD millions) of the main US banks



















Sources: banks’ annual reports
Graphique 6








1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Sources: banks’ annual reports 
Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 7 • November 2005  85ARTICLES
Signiﬁ  cance and limitations of the VAR ﬁ  gures publicly disclosed by large ﬁ  nancial institutions
be unwound rapidly; losses – even if they turn out 
to be signiﬁ  cant - should be contained by stop-losses, 
without jeopardising the institution’s survival nor 
posing a threat to ﬁ  nancial stability; 
• however, if VARs correspond to relatively illiquid 
positions (at least in the case of market tensions), 
there is clearly a greater risk of ﬁ  nancial instability: 
e.g. the rescue of the LTCM hedge fund10;
• lastly, sharp swings in VAR ﬁ  gures could simply be 
a sign of inadequate risk management. The macro-
ﬁ  nancial lessons to be drawn from VAR disclosures 
will therefore depend on the analysis that is made of 
each individual situation. 
3|3  An international approach 
  for greater and more 
 widespread  transparency
What remains to be done by ﬁ  nancial institutions 
in terms of VAR public disclosure to take full 
advantage of these data? Shouldn’t the efforts 
made towards achieving greater transparency
be stepped up?
The interest that central banks and bank regulators 
show in large ﬁ  nancial institutions’ public disclosure 
of VAR data is part of a broader trend towards 
promoting greater transparency among market 
participants. This concern essentially took shape in 
the 1990s after several episodes of ﬁ  nancial turmoil. 
Indeed, it appeared that, when a hidden piece of 
information was suddenly brought out into the open, 
this generally resulted in an over-reaction on the part 
of ﬁ  nancial markets, with a cost to the community.
The commonly-shared objective is to promote 
“market discipline [that] can play an important role 
in maintaining ﬁ  nancial market stability” thanks to 
greater transparency and through the disclosure of 
more detailed and pertinent data on the market risks 
taken on by large ﬁ  nancial institutions.11
Of course, bank regulators are in possession of 
more detailed information on the institutions that 
they supervise. However, VAR public disclosures 
are meaningful to them for the following reasons: 
ﬁ  rst, they help bring about market discipline, which 
contributes to the sound functioning of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions; second, they can be used as a basis 
for conducting international analyses of factors of 
vulnerability that are likely to affect ﬁ  nancial stability; 
ﬁ  nally, they can be a useful communication tool. 
In this context, the Fisher II report recommended 
— as early as 2001 — that major ﬁ  nancial institutions 
disclose their market risk data and established that 
the VAR methodology could be a useful tool to do so. 
This report also mentions the need to supplement the 
gross period-end ﬁ  gures with more detailed ﬁ  gures 
(average, maximum and minimum values, indicators 
of the ex post relevance of expected VAR ﬁ  gures). 
These recommendations were aimed at all market 
participants: banks, insurance companies, various 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries or investors such as hedge 
funds. However, it was widely acknowledged that 
these recommendations would most likely be 
implemented more rapidly by regulated bodies, in 
particular banks, than other market participants. 
This is precisely what happened.
10  Which obviously also covered a number of other issues.
11  Report by the so-called Fisher II working group. It applies to the relations between private counterparties.  It should be noted, however, that central banks have also 
made signiﬁ  cant efforts towards achieving greater transparency, in particular in terms of the information that they disclose on their currency reserve management, 
notably in the framework of the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard.
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This article has focused on the VAR ﬁ  gures disclosed 
by banks, their signiﬁ  cance and limitations, as well 
as the progress that remains to be made in order to 
achieve greater transparency on the part of these 
institutions. In the light of the current developments, 
it seems desirable to continue encouraging other 
regulated ﬁ  nancial institutions, such as mutual 
funds, to disclose the VAR for their portfolios, while 
making sure that the risk measures chosen are 
suited to the particular conditions in which these 
institutions invest on ﬁ  nancial markets.  
Institutions that are little or not regulated, such 
as hedge funds, are those which, up until now, 
have made the least headway in implementing 
the recommendations put forward by the Fisher II 
Working Group. Their failure to apply the Fisher II 
recommendations reﬂ  ects, to a certain extent, their 
lack of interest in becoming more transparent. Given 
the key role that these institutions play on interbank 
markets, they should be encouraged to disclose more 
information on their risks. Markets participants 
and regulators could clearly put this information to 
good use to contribute to the prevention of ﬁ  nancial 
crises.12 More speciﬁ  cally, these funds – which 
are still too opaque - would be making signiﬁ  cant 
progress if they were to start disclosing their VARs.
On the other hand, banks, under the aegis of their 
regulators, have already implemented most of the 
Fisher II recommendations. As mentioned above, 
incentives in favour of VAR disclosure by listed French 
banks falls within the competence of the AMF.13
This issue is now also covered by the Third Pillar of 
Basel II (to be implemented in 2007) and by the future 
Capital Requirements Directive. Bank regulators will 
therefore pay greater attention to market discipline, 
including banks’ transparency on their market risks. 
It is in this context that this study on the signiﬁ  cance 
and limitations of VAR disclosures takes on its full 
meaning.
In the light of the experience that they will have 
acquired following the full implementation of 
Basel II, bank regulators will be able to judge whether 
— given the risk management techniques currently 
available — a more systematic and/or transparent 
disclosure of VAR ﬁ  gures is necessary for sound 
market discipline. They will then be able to take 
action within the framework of Basel II. 
One way of bolstering ﬁ  nancial stability would be to 
get international credit institutions to display greater 
transparency when describing the methods used to 
calculate their VAR statistics, in addition to disclosing 
VAR ﬁ  gures. Credit institutions could usefully include 
more precise and easily comparable methodological 
explanations in their annual reports. This, however, 
should not prevent the leading banks from setting up 
more sophisticated risk management techniques nor 
impinge on their communication policy. 
Furthermore, it appears essential – for the reasons 
outlined in this article – to supplement the VAR 
ﬁ  gures in order to gain a better insight into the 
risks taken on by ﬁ  nancial institutions. A systematic 
disclosure of information on stress tests should also 
help to reduce the risk of herd behaviour, which 
could result from banks’ exclusive use of VARs in 
their communication strategies. Disclosed VARs can, 
within certain limits, be used to make international 
comparisons and aggregations. On the other hand, 
disclosed stress tests should, instead, enable an 
external analyst to make a more in-depth assessment 
of the situation of each individual institution. 
To reach these objectives in the best possible manner, it 
seems necessary to promote international cooperation 
in order to maintain a level playing ﬁ  eld between the 
major international ﬁ  nancial institutions.
12  This is also one of the conclusions drawn by the Counterparty Risk Management policy Group II.
13  At present, the obligations in terms of risk disclosure imposed by the AMF can be met in several ways, including the publication of VAR ﬁ  gures. Most major ﬁ  nancial 
institutions apply this method.
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Box
Is it possible to compute aggregate indicators
or are individual VARs the only option?
VAR ﬁ  gures generally disclosed by banks represent the worst-case loss expected over a one-day holding period and with 
a 99% conﬁ  dence interval. Some banks choose to calculate a 10-day VAR, from which it is possible to derive a 1-day VAR 
under the assumption of a Gaussian distribution function.
In addition to analysing the ﬁ  gures disclosed by each individual credit institution, it is also necessary to construct synthetic 
indicators. Speciﬁ  cally, it would be useful to obtain an aggregate indicator based on the individual VARs. The aggregate 
VAR of a group of banks should be equal to the worst-case potential loss incurred by this group over a given holding period 
and with a 99% conﬁ  dence interval. It is, however, impossible to derive this ﬁ  gure directly from the individual VARs without 
any information or assumptions on the correlations between the losses incurred by the various banks and the shape of 
the distribution functions. Several avenues can nevertheless be explored:
1. The most obvious synthetic VAR indicator is the arithmetic mean (or sum) of individual VARs. It is generally a simple 
arithmetic mean, which is complemented by the minimum and maximum values as well as the different fractiles of the 
sample of VARs. 
The arithmetic mean (or sum) is an adequate statistical aggregation of individual VARs only under the assumption that 
the proﬁ  ts and losses of the various banks follow a perfectly correlated distribution. This is generally not a very realistic 
assumption. It should, nevertheless, not be disregarded because it relates to a speciﬁ  c risk to ﬁ  nancial stability, when 
similar positions are taken by various banks (see below). The sum of VARs is also a useful upperbound of the aggregation 
of individual VARs, assuming that the underlying probability distributions are normal, irrespective of their degree of 
correlation. 
2. Another assumption can be made, i.e. that banks’ proﬁ  ts and losses follow an uncorrelated Gaussian probability 
distribution. In this case it is possible to calculate, based on the individual VARs, an indicator of the worst-case cumulated 
loss over a 1 day holding period and with a 99% conﬁ  dence interval for all banks under review. It is a quadratic sum, which 
















It is worth noting that – contrary to a simple sum or mean – the result of this aggregate VAR calculation varies depending 
on whether the individual VAR ﬁ  gures are close or very different from one another; the more dispersed the individual 
VAR ﬁ  gures, the higher the aggregate VAR. This can be linked to the initial assumption that banks’ proﬁ  ts and losses are 
uncorrelated; when the VARs of a large number of banks are of the same order of magnitude, the aggregate VAR of the 
sample beneﬁ  ts from a signiﬁ  cant diversiﬁ  cation effect; this effect is much lower when a small number of credit institutions 
display large VARs while most other institutions have small VARs. 
This characteristic could be useful for analysing the risks to ﬁ  nancial stability because – for a given arithmetic mean – it 
penalises the concentration of risk on a small number of credit institutions which can turn out to be weak links in the 
ﬁ  nancial system; they could indeed trigger processes that are detrimental to ﬁ  nancial stability, either through the realisation 
of credit risk or through crisis dynamics, such as in the LTCM episode. However, this aggregate VAR does not provide any 
information on another type of risk, the so-called crowded trades, i.e. when similar positions are taken by various institutions. 
ANNEX
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This phenomenon represents a threat to ﬁ  nancial stability as it is likely to disrupt market dynamics in the event that several 
institutions decide to unwind their similar position simultaneously. In this case, the normal probability distributions followed 
by proﬁ  ts and losses are clearly correlated, which invalidates the assumptions underlying the calculation of the AVAR. As 
mentioned above, a simple sum is, in this respect, more appropriate.
3. Lastly, in the more realistic and general case where banks’ proﬁ  ts and losses do not follow a Gaussian probability 
distribution, caution is required because none of the above-mentioned indicators are entirely adequate. In particular, the 
sum of VARs does not necessarily exceed the aggregate VAR at the same level of conﬁ  dence. The sum of VARs is in fact an 
upperbound at a much lower conﬁ  dence level, i.e. 1-n (1–p) with n the number of banks under review and p the conﬁ  dence 
interval of individual VARs (see Coudert and Attia, 2005). The conﬁ  dence interval therefore declines in proportion to the 
size of the sample. This measure is therefore hardly useful in the case of a large sample.
Here is a simple example. Consider two banks whose losses depend on four different situations, as follows: 
State of nature 1 2 3 4
Probability of this state 0.8 0.8 0.3 98.1
Loss of bank 1  1.000 0 100 Proﬁ  ts
Loss of bank 2  0 1.000 100 Proﬁ  ts
Aggregate loss 1.000 1.000 200 Proﬁ  ts
It appears that:
• the VAR of bank 1 equals 100 with a 99% conﬁ  dence interval, because the loss will exceed or equal 100 in less than 1% 
of cases. The VAR of bank 2 is equals 100 for the same reason. The sum of two banks’ VARs is therefore 200;
• however, the aggregate VAR is equal to 1,000 with a 99% conﬁ  dence interval, since the loss incurred by the two banks 
taken together is 1,000 in 1.6% of cases. 
This very simple example shows that the sum of VARs does not necessarily exceed the aggregate VAR. More speciﬁ  cally, 
this situation occurs under two conditions: 
• losses at the tail-end of the distribution (less than 1%) are substantial;
• the losses incurred by both banks do not occur in the same “state of nature”. If losses occurred simultaneously (correlation 
coefﬁ  cient of 1), the sum of VARs would be a decent measure of the aggregate VAR, even in the presence of outliers at 
the tail-end of the distribution. 
In conclusion, computing synthetic indicators by aggregating VAR ﬁ  gures disclosed by individual banks is useful from 
the perspective of ﬁ  nancial stability, even though these indicators do not give an accurate measure of the maximum total 
losses of all banks under review. It is nevertheless important that the strong methodological assumptions, on which these 
calculations are based, be taken into account when analysing the signiﬁ  cance of the aggregate ﬁ  gures. 
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